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Consumersí Rights in the Laissez-Faire 
Economy: How Much Caveat for the Emptor? 
Jan Narveson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What are the Consumerís rights in a free enterprise 
economy?  It is tempting to supply a one-word answer: None.  
After all, the Consumer has the final word: ìNo!î  What more do 
we need?  But to say this would be misleading.  To begin with, 
the right to say No! is itself a major right, more important 
perhaps than anything else.  And it is a right; so the answer 
ìnoneî is misleading, indeed just false.  Further thought suggests 
that the situation is quite a bit more complicated than that.  
When the would-be Consumer becomes a customer, she needs to 
exercise judgment and caution.  But the thesis that all the 
responsibility rests on the Consumerís shoulders must be 
rejected, despite the plausibility of a simple invoking of caveat 
emptor (ìLet the buyer beware!î).  This essay will propose a 
general criterion as being the basically right one to apply. 
II. RIGHTS IN GENERAL 
A. What Are They? 
To begin with, perhaps we had better make clear what rights 
are.  To have a right is to have a status that somehow imposes 
requirements on others.  In the case where these are legal 
requirements, they would be enforceable either by the 
institutions of the civil law or even by those of criminal law.  A 
theory about rights is a theory about the ìsomehowî: it would tell 
us how it is that the people who (so the theorist claims) earn the 
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status of rightholder do, in fact, earn itówhat are the 
characteristics of the rightholder and his or her relation to others 
that leads to the fixing of duties on the part of those against 
whom these rights are held.  All rights entail duties to refrain 
from certain actions, namely those that would render it 
impossible for the agent to do what he or she is being said to 
have the right to do.  Another sort of right, one that additionally 
entails positive requirements to act on the institutions of the law 
to provide protections to the rightholder, is also conceptually 
definable.  The general point, then, is simply that when we talk 
of someoneís rights, we are thereby talking of someone elseís 
duties.  In the case of Consumers and Sellers, the Consumerís 
right is, in some way or another, the Sellerís duty. 
Letís begin the present inquiry, then, by pointing out that 
everyone has rightsóconsumers and producers alike.  (And letís 
not forget that all of us are both.)  Whether there are ìconsumerís 
rightsî is then a question of whether we have, in our capacity as 
consumers, any special rights, over and above what we already 
have generally as people.  And the answer to this too, I shall 
argue, is in the affirmative.  However, I shall also argue that we 
can, given a suitably normal description of the situations of 
consumers in relation to suppliers, deduce consumer rights from 
a more general thesis not confined to consumers. 
B. Why? 
We need to make clear, in a general way, what rights people 
have, qua people.  Therefore, we need a deep inquiry, for there is 
little point in mere proclamations.  Such an inquiry would also 
explain why we should even have the rights proposed.  But, while 
we hardly have the space to undertake such an inquiry here, a 
few general things can be usefully said.  The viewpoint of this 
essay is straightforward and classically liberal: We all have the 
right to do whatever we wish, with the very substantial exception 
that we may not, in doing what we wish, impose (significant, 
avoidable) costs on others.1  This is a slightly more precise way, 
perhaps, of expressing the original Hobbesian Law of Nature: 
That we are always to ìseek peaceî and to use force only for self-
defense, noting that we may also assist in defending from attack 
whoever voluntarily enlists us to do so.2 
The same view can be expressed in terms of liberty, a fact 
that has given rise to the contemporary use of the term 
 
 1 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92-93 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1991) (1651); JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 7 (1988). 
 2 HOBBES, supra note 1, at 92. 
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ìlibertarianismî to designate that general outlook.  The view, so 
expressed, is that we all have a general right to liberty, which 
means that we must respect that right on the part of everyone 
else, just as they must respect it in relation to us.3  Hobbes 
expressed this idea in his Second Law of Nature: That we are ìto 
lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himselfe.î4 
Why should we accept this general outlook?  I have in 
various writings defended libertarianism in much the same way 
as Hobbes and the other classic writers seem to want to defend it: 
namely, as the maximally rational arrangement for 
interpersonally regulating the activities of people in society.5  It is 
the view that commends itself to us on the broadest interpersonal 
basis.  In that sense, this Libertarian Principle may also be 
claimed as identifying the common good for the general case of 
human interaction.  The common good is, in effect, liberty. 
The reasoning begins with people as they are.  What are 
they?  First, people are possessed of a very wide range of 
interests and abilities.  Second, they are capable of 
understanding and exchanging ideas about practical matters and 
of reacting to the deliberations and decisions of their fellows.  
Practical thinking addresses the interests and values we have at 
the time and our resources for advancing these, and allows us to 
decide what to do in light of this information (including the 
decision to seek more information).  While each of us operates in 
an environment that includes physical things and situations, 
such as weather, our environment also includes other people.  We 
know some people in our conscious neighborhood, but we also 
have the knowledge that there are many more not so much 
farther on and a very great many more still farther on. 
Some of these people will be ones with whom we interact 
more or less.  The special feature about interaction with fellow 
humans is that it can be, and often is, strategicóA reacts to Bís 
reaction to Aóand how we act toward another person is a 
function in part of what we think the other person will do.  That, 
in turn, is a function of what we take his reasoning processes to 
be, including how we expect him to react to our own behavior. 
 
 3 See J. Charles King, Moral Theory and the Foundations of Social Order, in THE 
LIBERTARIAN READER 16, 27 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1982).  See generally JAN NARVESON, 
THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (Temple Univ. Press 1988). 
 4 HOBBES, supra note 1, at 92. 
 5 JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (Temple Univ. Press 1988); Jan Narveson, 
Contracting for Liberty, in JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 55-65 
(James P. Sterba ed., 4th ed. 2003); Jan Narveson, Libertarianism, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 306, 306-24 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000). 
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While that may sound complicated, the very truth of this fact 
can be made to work in favor of relatively simple principles.  All 
of us, potentially, have much to fear from our fellows who can, at 
the worst, kill or do other terrible things to us.  But we also all 
have, potentially, much to gain from our fellows, even though 
their tastes and specific abilities vary so widely.  Such wide 
variation is important, for it means that helping our fellows, 
especially in major respects, is likely to be difficult and to require 
subtle and detailed knowledge of others that we do not typically 
have.  On the other hand, it is fairly easy to know what would 
hurt, damage, or kill others. 
The stage is set, then, for a sort of ìdealîóthe ìsocial 
contractî in its classic form.  The main agreement point calls 
upon all to refrain from harming, injuring, and generally 
interfering with each other, except only in the case where the 
other party is actively attempting to hurt or injure us.  But with 
regards to helping others, here we rely on specific arrangements 
made between interested parties.  The principle for those, then, 
is simply to keep oneís agreements once made.  Between the two, 
what we have is a fully cooperative societyóa society in which 
we all cooperate in supporting the conditions in which we can 
each work or play or interact with others to maximum, mutual 
advantage.  Non-aggression underpins society; cooperative 
mutually advantageous action via specific negotiation, 
agreement, and contract propels it forward to the general 
betterment, in the end, of all.  Law has its place in this, providing 
structure where needed to promote this cooperative state of 
affairs.  Both criminal and civil law work to curb our tendency to 
bypass cooperation (by larceny, violence, or fraud) for our own 
personal gain.  Civil law especially works to enable us to redress 
damages in arrangements gone awry. 
It is, I think, extremely difficult to improve on this general 
structure of basic rights.  And it is that structure that enables us 
to focus specifically on the rights of the Consumer in the 
extremely important area of commercial transactions. 
C. Property 
Probably the most vexing single question about social 
matters, and especially about economic matters in society, is 
whether individual ownership of thingsóprivate propertyóis 
justifiable.  To see why it plausibly is, we need but appreciate 
that the right to property can be seen as a spin-off from the 
general libertarian outlook.  The right of property, if it is one, 
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exists antecedently to any acts of any governmentsóit is not 
identified, informed, or legislated by governments.6  If a 
government passes a piece of legislation about property, our 
question is: does it act consistently with the antecedently 
knowable right of property?  The word of government is not what 
establishes the property right.  Or, to put it in stronger terms, 
governments have no authority whatsoever that they do not have 
purely by virtue of being formulators and perhaps enforcers of 
the ìnaturalî lawóthe moral rules that pass muster with 
rational agents generally.7 
So, is there a right to property or not?  I side with Locke on 
the matter in holding that there is, though not quite exactly for 
his stated reason.8  Still, his reason is pretty good.  Property, in 
Lockeís view, is the result of somebodyís efforts, somebodyís 
labor.  His right of property is nothing more than his right to do 
the things he has done and wants to continue to do in relation to 
the items in question.9  That is what property is: the right to use 
and to continue using the thing in question as one wants.  More 
generally, it is the right to determine the disposition of the thing 
owned; others must clear any proposed uses of it with the person 
said to be the ìowner.î  If our state-of-nature Crusoe, as it were, 
has plowed up some ground or hacked a table out of a tree, with a 
view to planting or playing gin rummy or whatever, then if 
anyone comes along and undertakes some other use of that item, 
a use incompatible with Crusoeís purposes, then that person is 
an aggressor.  He has, by his actions, intervened to upset the 
pattern of Crusoeís own activityóthe very thing that our general 
right of liberty forbids.  Once initial possession is clear, we 
proceed by exchange as well as by work.  Once anyone owns 
something and anyone else owns something else, they are 
morally in a position to make an exchange if they so desire. 
The classical liberal tradition has it, in Lockeís terminology, 
that we ìown ourselves.î10 Discussants have attached all sorts of 
exotic meanings to this phrase, but, in fact, its meaning is quite 
straightforward and yields a result that is simply identical with 
the Libertarian Principle.  To ìownî something is to be in a 
position of authority over its use, so that anyone else who wants 
to use it in some way must, in principle, obtain the permission of 
the owner.  In short, owners are people with the right to exclude.  
 
 6 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 7 See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and 
the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLíY 77 (2002). 
 8 LOCKE, supra note 6, at 287-88. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
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And so self-ownership is the right to exclude others from the use 
of oneself: if they want you to do something, or to do something to 
you, they must ask.  That is exactly what the  libertarian 
principle asserts.  Ownership of things outside the self is, in 
effect, an application of the rights termed ìself-ownershipî to 
such things by virtue of the agentís self-initiated actions 
involving those things. 
Obviously, any rights identified in this way are subject to the 
restriction that they are exercised during ìgood behaviorî: that is 
to say, that the exerciser has not done anything that would 
warrant abridging his right in some way.  Thus, the thief does 
not have the right to what he has taken, and others may seize it 
by force if need be (and collect costs of apprehension and perhaps 
also to provide some extra disincentive for doing such things in 
the future.  Just how to adjust these disincentives is a difficult 
matter that, fortunately, we will not need to go into here.) 
In short, property rights in things outside ourselves are a 
subset of liberty rightsóthe general right of liberty being the 
basic right from which all other legitimate ones are derived, 
given appropriate descriptions of the relevant circumstances.  It 
may perhaps be unnecessary to add that this basic right is what 
we nowadays call a ìnegativeî right (a right that others not do 
something to the rightholder), not a ìpositiveî right (a right that 
the rightholder be in some way assisted in doing the things he 
has this right to do).  If I want your help, I have to ask for it, or 
make an offer for it, and I get the help only if this request or this 
offer is accepted. 
D. Realism 
It may certainly be suggested that this program is, in these 
days of big government, unreal.  After all, we all live in an 
environment in which governments, at many levels, have 
immense powers going far beyond anything that the classical 
libertarian rights endorse.11  If we start with the premises of 
classical liberalism, we appear to be saying that virtually 
everything done by virtually every government is immoral and 
should be illegal.12 
 
 
 11 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ch. 6 (1974); 
AMERICAN RADICAL THOUGHT: THE LIBERTARIAN TRADITION (Henry J. Silverman ed., 
1970); TIBOR R. MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS 100-102 (1989) (discussing the 
libertarian view of individual rights). 
 12 See generally L. T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM (1964) (discussing the classical traits of 
liberalism); THEODORE MEYER GREENE, LIBERALISM:  ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE (1957) 
(discussing modern misconceptions of classical liberalism). 
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There are two very different ways to respond to such an 
objection.  On the purely theoretical front the only acceptable 
response is to pick up the glove and say to the defenders of big 
government, ìProve it!î  I think we are in a position to guarantee 
that they will be unable to do this, but perhaps it does not matter 
for present purposes. 
Another, perhaps more pertinent response, is to say that it is 
still worth finding out what consumer (or other economic) rights 
are as issuing from the libertarian view because it is the general 
view underlying our economic system.  This person we are calling 
ìthe consumerî is operating in a market environment.  In the free 
economy no one is required to be a producer.  Those who produce 
typically act with a view to profit, and consumers consume with a 
relentless eye to their own satisfaction and no sense of obligation 
to the people who supply their needs.  Therefore, the converse is 
true: We are to presume that a given firm is after our dollarsó
not our health, education, welfare, or happiness.  We are out for 
those things and many moreónotably our comfort and our 
entertainment.  We do not need any other justification whatsoever 
for spending our dollars as we do.  We ìConsumersî are, in this 
system, sovereign, king.  The Consumer calls the shots.  Nobody 
may tell him what to buy or why.  Nobody may dictate prices to 
him.  He makes his own decisions, and that is the end of the 
matter. 
III. CONSUMER RIGHTS 
A. The Basics 
Nevertheless, it is useful to spell out a bit more precisely 
what follows in the way of rights specific to consumers from the 
thesis that the consumer shares with all the general right to be 
and do whatever he or she wishes to be and do, subject to the 
constraint of respecting the same right for all others.  For this 
purpose, we first need to look at a matter of fundamental 
importance to any theory of rights of this general type: the 
baseline of interaction.  For present purposes, that baseline is our 
encounter in the marketplace, an encounter between two free 
beings.  However, we will stipulate here that this encounter is 
not only between ìfreeî beings, but also innocent beings, in the 
sense that we are presumed not to have done anything previously 
that would justify curtailment of the standard rights.  If we are 
guilty of some punishable failing in the past, that may impugn 
our status as free-market participants.  But we shall take it that 
few persons are guilty in that way, and our question is: What is 
owed to persons in this normal case, where relevant innocence 
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characterizes the parties? 
On this libertarian view, everyone is subject to a general 
requirement, or obligation, to respect the freedom of all others.  
There is a more precise way to summarize this general 
obligation, which has been admirably formulated by David 
Gauthier in what he calls the ìLockean Proviso.î13  The Gauthier 
version says: ìDonít better by worsening.  Do not make yourself 
better off than you would have been in someone elseís absence, by 
making that person worse off than he would have been in your 
absence.î14  In short, do not worsen the net situation of the person 
with whom you interact.  (ëNetî is needed here: the dentistís 
benefits come at some cost in pain and discomfort, but on the 
whole she leaves her patient better off.)  It will be appreciated 
that the ìProviso,î so conceived, is really another restatement of 
the Libertarian Principle.  I believe we can also see that it 
provides a fruitful key to the matter of consumer rights. 
B. Describing the Goods 
Transactions in the business society are voluntary.  The 
potential purchaser is under no general obligation to buy, and 
the seller is under no obligation to sell.  (Of course, either may be 
under such obligations from, say, a spouse or friends or other 
persons with special involvements, but that lies beyond our 
purview.)  Both agents, then, are in the marketplace because 
they have interests, wants, desires, and values that they hope to 
satisfy by their market activities.  And thatís it.  But while this is 
true and fundamental, we must also appreciate an important 
basic aspect of any exchange: that the parties proceed on the 
basis of descriptions of whatever is being exchanged.  One party, 
the seller, in effect starts the ball rolling by making an offer.  The 
other party is presumably in search of some or other good or 
service: she contemplates the offer in question and decides to 
take it or not.  How does she do this?  She must have some 
information prior to purchase or rejection, and this information 
must, in the nature of the case, come at least in part from the 
seller.  Simply by recognizing that the other party is a seller with 
something to sell (and the seller recognizing a buyer with intent 
to buy), a fair amount of information has already been processed, 
 
 13 The expression is rather misleading, since it has little to do with the ìprovisoî 
urged by Locke to limit our acquisition of property.  It is, accordingly, to be understood 
here as simply Gauthierís coined phrase for the principle he adumbrates, not as a 
reference back to the very disputable and disputed phrase in Lockeís writings that 
stimulated its recent prominence.  DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 205-11 
(1986). 
 14 David Gauthier, Uniting Separate Persons, in RATIONALITY, JUSTICE AND THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 176, 182 (David Gauthier & Robert Sugden eds., 1993). 
NARVESON FINAL MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:47 PM 
189 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 7:181 
of course.  But getting us to the point where the consumer says 
ìYesî and hands over his money and the seller hands over the 
goods or performs the contracted-for services requires more.  The 
ìmoreî in question is in effect or (more usually) in fact a 
description of what is to be sold. 
In a sense, there are two other sources of information for this 
description.  First, there is previously acquired information or 
background information that potential purchasers are free to 
acquire by doing whatever homework they may like and be able 
to do.  They might read Consumersí Reports, talk with 
acquaintances, and so on.  But second, there is what the seller 
says about his product in his sales pitch or in the labeling of that 
product.  (It can even be nonverbal: he can hold up the goods for 
the potential buyer to see for himself, or feel, or even sample.)  
What is easily overlooked or underestimated in this process is 
that information is conveyed by standard usage of whatever 
terminology is employed.  When the merchant describes the goods 
in some way or another, he employs a language, one spoken in 
common by himself and the buyer.15  In both cases, then, there is 
a communicative process, one that can be misused, derailed, or 
otherwise go wrong. 
C. Caveat Emptor? 
When there is a description of the goods, even one so simple 
as applying a familiar single common noun to it, the consumer 
gets a message.  Which message?  There is the one the consumer 
infers from that structure of words (or whatever mode of 
communication is employed), and then there is what the 
purveyor intended to convey.  The first is a potential problem 
because the consumer may get information from two different 
sources: the public rules of the language (the ìstandard meaningî 
of the terms), and, in addition, from a body of impinging 
information that may indefinitely modify his interpretations.  
The second presents a different problem since we must expect 
that the seller will want to bias the information in such a way as 
to increase the likelihood of turning the potential buyer into an 
actual buyer to the sellerís profit.  A satisfactory theory of 
consumer-seller relations needs to cope with both sources of 
ìnoise.î 
Here is where a first important entry into what we may 
consider to be consumer rights takes place.  Words are public, 
 
 15 If their languages are not the same, they must work through interpreters, of 
course, but this only complicates the same process, for the interpreter attempts to match 
the vocabulary of the one language with a vocabulary from the other for the purposes at 
hand. 
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and for that very reason, they are mostly standard.  If the seller 
employs a special word, say a technical term or even one 
contrived by the seller for the purpose, then the consumer will 
need to have this explained somehow.  The process of doing so 
will again employ standard language and may again run into 
noise from the consumerís peripheral sources of 
information/misinformation. 
Still, we can already see that this is where Caveat Emptor 
breaks down.  The idea behind it is that the Consumer bears all 
the risk in an exchange.  But for it to be reasonable to hold that 
he does bear it, Consumer must know what he is getting into.  
But knowing that requires some kind of language, and language 
is intrinsically not the sort of thing that the consumer by himself 
can control.  Language is not two Humpty Dumptys deciding to 
use words however they wish.  The need to communicate makes 
that idea a non-starter.  It has become commonplace in 
philosophy nowadays that the idea of a ìprivate languageî is 
impossible,16 but that need not concern us here.  All that matters 
to us, in this hands-on, arms-length world of business relations, 
is that for carrying on transactions in the marketplace, a public 
language is indispensable.  In communications, the risks are 
shared.  I decide how to interpret you, you decide how to 
interpret me.  Neither of us can do that unless we have some 
basis for interpretationóand neither of us as individuals 
supplies that basis.  Instead, the public rules of language do that.  
All speakers must take responsibility for what they mean, and 
that responsibility is rooted in public meanings. 
D. Three Components of Meaning 
So, what exactly does ìstandard languageî convey in its 
designative capacity?  Enormous amounts of philosophizing 
about language could leave one thoroughly confused on that 
subject, but it had better not be that difficult.  We may here 
distinguish three components likely to enter into the structuring 
of these messages.  First, there will be what we will call 
ìdictionary meanings.î  True, we can then ask, ìWhich 
dictionaries do we go by?  What do dictionary compilers think 
they are doing?î  But while those questions are askable, 
legitimate, and important, it remains that dictionaries do get 
written and people do make use of them for the very good reason 
that we do have problems, and we know that solving them 
requires public rules.  It makes sense to try to codify those.  
Dictionaries are attempts at such codification, articulating the  
 
 16 For the classic argument, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
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standard meanings of the day.  They help.  Second, there are 
informal accretions to meaning from community experienceóbut 
communities vary.  One such community may attach a rather 
different accretion of meaning than another, thus complicating 
life for the would-be student of commerce.  And finally, what can 
be regarded as a special subset of the previous category, there is 
the fund of commonly known information in the consumer 
community.  This last is not strictly ìpart of the meaning of the 
wordî and yet, there it isótypically both the consumer and the 
seller know it. 
All of this enables us to make a suggestion.  Consumer goods 
are typically designated by some one or some very few words in a 
phrase standardly applied to the items in question.  The word or 
label, ìF,î when it denotes some usable thing, ordinarily conveys 
the sense that the thing will serve a certain purpose or 
purposesóthe one or ones familiarly implied by the name in 
question via any or all of the three sources of meaning mentioned 
above.  If I say this is a ìrakeî I am conveying to you the 
information that it will be useful for raking, say leaves or other 
such things.  If it is a potato peeler, I convey that it will be useful 
for that.  Such functional description is pervasive in 
Consumerland for the obvious reason that the Consumer is here 
in the marketplace precisely because he or she is in search of 
something that will serve some purpose or purposes known 
especially to her or him.  Thus, it is those purposes that need to 
be known so that they can be catered to by the manufacturer and 
then  by the retailer of those items.  The development of a 
vocabulary that more or less precisely conveys the functions in 
question is, thus, an essential for efficient market exchange. 
E. Criteria and Standards 
The relevant criteria for assessing performance of a 
consumer good are based on the goodís purpose(s).  But then the 
question arises, how well will it serve that purpose?  Given that 
the consumer must act on information at hand, that question is, 
in effect, how well can we expect it to serve that purpose given 
the description under which it is being proffered?  Here we get 
into what could be a delicate issue.  But there is a plausible, 
indeed arguably indispensable, general condition that we can 
invoke: If Seller doesnít qualify the description, then Consumer 
legitimately assumes that it will perform at least normally for 
the purposes in question.  No precise definition of ìnormalî is 
intended, or perhaps possible, for this purpose; nevertheless, the 
point is that if what Consumer gets under the description ìFî 
performs so miserably as to be unrecognizable, then he has a 
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complaint.  Consumer is entitled to descriptions employing  
normal language, in the absence of special cues or qualifications, 
and normal language carries with it connotations of normalcy in 
performance unless qualifications are explicitly invokedóa 
process that can easily be initiated given the ready availability of 
more language.  It is easy for Seller to alter his claim, after all.  If 
what he is selling is substandard and known to be, he can say so.  
He often does: one can often find a ìsubstandardî rack at much 
reduced prices.  That is as it should be.  No wrong is done by 
Seller in offering low-quality goods so long as he does not 
describe his offerings in such a way as to lead a normal user of 
the language to believe they are standard or better.  It is when he 
does not, and yet his goods are indeed below normal performance 
levels, that the consumer has a beef. 
As a rule of thumb, we may suggest that goods found to be 
substandard when they are not explicitly billed as such may be 
returned to Seller for a full refund.  Should this be a right?  It is a 
strong presumption, and any company that does not do this will 
soon get a reputation for unreliability.  It may be best to leave it 
at that. 
We can invoke our third identified source of information as 
well.  In addition to the very meaning of the words we use, there 
is the fairly closely related matter of what we may call 
Community Information.  It is often reasonable to assume that 
Consumer ìknowsî certain things, and it would be a boreóeven 
insulting perhapsóto mention the facts in question.  But, of 
course, in different communities different things will be items of 
familiar knowledge.  So it might be possible to seriously mislead 
customers in place A with descriptions that would cause no 
problems at all in place B.  Sellers need to be (and almost always 
are) aware of these disparities in background information-levels 
and must act accordingly. 
How does all this accord with our starting point of general 
rights of freedom?  The answer is found by identifying the status 
quo of Consumer vis-‡-vis Seller at the point of exchange, the 
marketplace.  Seller presumes certain general things about 
Consumer.  Specifically, he presumes that Consumer is ìin the 
market forî an item of type ìF,î and that he has a ìnormalî level 
of information about Fs and, for that matter, normal interests in 
using his F when he gets it.  Sellerís function in selling is that 
Consumerís acquisition of an F leaves Consumer better off than in 
the status quo, this being why he is there at all. 
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F. Making the Consumer Happy? 
Now, part of this would get us into Subjectivity Land in a 
way that no sane code of consumer law could tolerate.  Did 
Consumer make a ìgood buy?î  Thatís for Consumer to decide.  It 
is certainly not rational to require Seller to provide Consumer 
with something that he will be ìhappyî with.  Seller surely hopes 
to do this and would love it if he succeeded, for to succeed at this 
is to leave a Consumer who is ready to come back for more.  But 
meanwhile, there is a question of where to set the bottom line: At 
what point does Consumer actually have a complaint?  When do 
we reasonably judge that his rights have been infringed or 
violated?  To make such a judgment, we need to know whether 
the objective facts about the particular sample of F that 
Consumer acquired on the basis of the description provided by 
the Seller live up to what is reasonably understood to have been 
conveyed by that information.  And that is something we can find 
out, albeit at the level of imprecision that it is reasonable to 
expect in such matters. 
ìHere: you said this was a ëtoy submarine.í  But it doesnít 
submerge!  I want my money back!î  It is no good, at this point, 
for Seller to respond, ìBut I didnít say it would submerge.î  The 
language  used is such that he didnít need to say that.  On the 
contrary, the language used is such that he did have to say that 
it would not submerge if indeed he knew it would not.  What if he 
didnít know it wouldnít submerge, but nevertheless, the fact 
remains that it doesnít?  Here we get into the question of what 
degree of epistemic responsibility for product performance do we 
members of the broader community reasonably expect of our 
Seller?  This is no trifling matter nowadays when sales persons 
typically sell all manner of immensely complicated things whose 
inner workings are a complete mystery to the consumer, the 
seller, and even the defense lawyer.  Again, it is the sellerís 
description of the goods that licenses certain general 
expectations.  If the product does not live up to those 
expectations, then whether or not Seller knew or had reason to 
know of its actual performance characteristics, his description 
commits him to a certain standard of performance.  If it fails, he 
must take responsibility for thatóagain, unless he explicitly 
qualifies this in advance.  The Consumer needs to know what 
heís getting into in order for his purchase to be rational.  But 
often he doesnít know, and neither does Seller.  So for second 
best, Consumer reasonably expects a certain level of performance, 
and Seller knows that he has this reasonable expectationóknows 
it because he knows the meaning of the language in which he 
describes the product and, in addition, the typical array of 
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information that any consumer in that market would be expected 
to have.  Given all this, it is reasonable to hold the seller to what 
his description conveys. 
G. How Much Information? 
Another basic question that arises here is: How much 
information about his products does the seller need to supply to 
pass muster, morally speaking?  It would be easy to overstate 
this and to say, ìthe whole truth.î  But that is not reasonable.  
We must distinguish between the Whole Truth, on the one hand, 
and Nothing But the Truth on the other.  It is the latter, not the 
former, for which Seller is responsible.  If Seller says what is 
false, he is liable.  Not saying all that is true, however, is quite 
another matter.  Not the least of the reasons why it is 
unreasonable to make Seller responsible for the whole truth is 
that neither he nor anyone else actually knows the whole truthó
about anything.  No doubt there will always be further 
information turning up about any given thing, product or 
otherwise.  Moreover, some of this information just might turn 
out to be quite pertinent.  Who can know?  But whatever Seller 
does say about it, he can be held to account for.  If he does not 
know, all he has to do is confess his ignorance.  At some point, of 
course, his ignorance may be below the minimum required to 
participate in the sale of the item in question.  But above that 
line, ignorance is not surprising and is forgivable. 
However, Seller might know something of importance to a 
purchase of the particular item in question, and not say so.  Then 
there can be an issue whether he had a responsibility to say that.  
Now, the fundamental line is the status quo of our rational 
consumer at the time of purchase.  Will purchase of the item 
being sold leave the consumer better off than if heíd just stayed 
home and kept his money?  If not, and if the reason was not some 
change of taste or interest on the part of Consumer but was due 
instead to the performance of the purchased item in ways known 
to Seller but not revealed to Consumer, then Seller is at fault.  
On the other hand, if the item is, say, just mediocre and Seller 
knew that but did not volunteer the information, then, while it 
would have been virtuous for Seller to pipe up and volunteer this 
possibly useful further information, he is not guilty of fraud but 
merely of sharpish practice.  That should not surprise anyone, 
including Normal Canny Consumer.  Seller may live to regret it: 
the competitor down the street may be more forthright, and 
Sellerís former customers may flock to the competitorís store and 
desert the tightlipped merchant.  Fair enough. 
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Suppose that Consumer can get the same item down the 
street at Ziggyís for 40% less: Is Seller responsible for providing 
this information?  Surely not.  There needs to be a fair division of 
labor, as it were, regarding the discovery and supplying of 
information.  And, of course, Consumer, who has many 
advantages over Seller, has this one in particular: He can put 
Seller on the spot by simply asking.  Then the requirement that 
Seller, whatever else he does, not intentionally produce false 
information covers the Consumer very well.  Consumer uses his 
own judgment in deciding how to interpret non-answers, but our 
principle protects him in the case of false answers. 
In noting that Consumer ìcan put Seller on the spot by 
simply asking,î we enter into another of those difficult areas of 
modern life.  For in modern Consumerland, asking is not so easy 
after all, as anyone with an obscure computer problem who 
attempts to query the manufacturer can testify.  Indeed, there 
needs to be much thought about just how ìsimplyî the consumer 
should be able to ask. 
Meanwhile, we can differentiate this type of case, of non-
culpable ignorance on the part of the Seller, from the preceding 
one, in which Consumer is deliberately misled, by suggesting 
that while the consumer may not have a right to Sellerís acting 
on the basis of common knowledge, it would nevertheless be a 
very good idea for the company to take the familiar attitude (or 
at least, an attitude that once was familiar) that ìThe customer 
is always right.î  This puts the onus on Seller, even though it 
must be admitted that customers can have rather bizarre ideas 
about expected performance.  Still, good business is one thing 
and what we may insist on as a matter of right is another.  The 
customer whose expectations are well out of line with standard 
meanings and normally known information is, in truth, wrong.  
But a company that extends the benefit even of unreasonable 
doubt to such customers may well win many more customers. 
H. How Fine the Print? 
There often are things Seller needs to make clear.  As such, 
how easy must it be for  Consumer to get the message in order for 
us to rule that Seller has done his duty?  A small page covered 
with microscopic print might be good enough if Consumer is most 
unlikely ever to need the information; not so, however, if itís 
something he really should be aware of before going further, with 
significant risk to himself if he is not.  Here again, it is difficult to 
formulate a precise standard that would cover all or even most 
cases.  What we can say is that this is a relevant variableóthat 
the complaint, ìbut it was practically indiscernible!î is often a 
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justified complaint.  Perhaps we had best settle for the 
suggestion that Consumer is entitled to have necessary 
information conveyed in such a way as to be absorbable without 
major effort, and let it go at that. 
I. Health and Safety 
One of the most important areas for applying our libertarian 
non-harm principle is that of health and safety.  We want what 
we buy to do us good, not harm.  We want it to leave us in a state 
of health no worse than when we began.  If the product is sold as 
a health-enhancement product, then we have a right to expect 
that it will leave us not only no worse off, but actually better off, 
in the specific ways that the manufacturer claims, while leaving 
us no worse off in any other way.  This expectation is, again, 
prima facie: A health-enhancing product might have known 
negative side effects, and Seller must duly warn Consumer of 
these facts when known.  Our non-harm criterion, however, 
continues to apply regarding things not mentioned on the list of 
known side effects. 
But all these are questions of degree, and what is more, the 
degree is especially that of probability.  Simply, few products will 
make you sick or not.  Almost all will increase or decrease the 
probability that you will become sick with this, that, or the other.  
The big question, then, is: What reasonable standard is there for 
determining merchant liability if things go wrong? How wrong 
must they go before Seller is liable? 
J. Liberty and Risk 
The first point I would make on this matter of risk is that 
the consumer should have his choice about this.  In so saying, I 
appear to be taking a position radically at odds with current 
trends in consumer law and the mores of commercial life as I 
understand them.  According to these trends, risk is borne 
virtually entirely by the Seller. Consumer is protected not only 
from defects in products, including ones that may have been 
unpredictable by the Seller, but also from Consumerís own poor 
judgment.  For instance, Consumer might buy a product which 
he knows is dangerous in some wayóthe case of cigarette 
smoking obviously comes to mind.  May a consumer sue a 
cigarette manufacturer when he gets lung cancer from regularly 
smoking the latterís product, even though fully informed about 
likely risks of doing so?  My answer is a flat negative.  Unless 
some manufacturer was so foolish as to assure the purchaser that 
no damage to his health would be forthcoming, the current (and 
long-standing) climate of information is such that a consumer 
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voluntarily purchasing a pack of cigarettes may be safely 
assumed to know what the risks are.  There could still be places 
in the world where that is not so, I suppose, and in those few 
cases, we may agree that the smoker could have a case.  And in 
any case, the manufacturer could (and is now legally required to) 
issue a clear warning.  If Consumer buys nonetheless, then the 
only reasonable view is that the case is closed.  With consumer 
rights should come consumer responsibilities.  If we walk in 
voluntarily and with our eyes open, then we take responsibility 
for the consequences of our actions, so long as there is not actual 
malice on the part of the other party. 
One of the most colossal extravagances of the American 
government today is found in its elaborate requirements for 
pharmaceuticals.  For such things to make it to the market an 
ordeal  awaits; new drugs are subjected to onerous testing 
procedures that take many years to complete and increase the 
cost of development by a huge factor.  During these many years, 
many people die because they cannot acquire drugs that would 
have likely saved their lives.  The lives that are saved by the 
extensive testing must be set against the lives that would have 
been saved by earlier access to the drugs, and it is widely held 
that the second set of deaths vastly outnumbers the first.17  This 
is a major-league denial of Consumer liberty.  It is an implicit 
assumption that consumers do not know what they are doing.  
And, insofar as manufacturers are held to the standards of the 
FDA, it is an assumption of unconcern by manufacturers.  All 
this goes against the environment of freedom to which, I think, 
we people are entitled. 
Were there no FDA, it would be easy enough for private 
companies to set up in business appraising and testing drugs; 
those which passed to a very high standard would be rated as 
such, and the rating company could assume liability for error.  
Pharmaceutical companies would advertise the ratings earned in 
this way as a selling point for their products; products that did 
not pass specific tests would have to be described as such.  The 
consumer wanting more protection could look to this 
ìpharmaceutical Underwriterís Laboratoriesî and pay the price; 
others could take greater risks and pay less.  Consumers 
knowingly buying less-tested products would not be able to sue; 
consumers buying more-tested products that nevertheless fail 
 
 17 Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Is the FDA Safe and Effective?, The 
Independent Institute, at http://www.fdareview.org/fda.pdf (last updated Sept. 26, 2001); 
Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDAís drug Approval Process, 1 J. REG. & SOC. COSTS 
35 (1990), available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,03887.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 
2004). 
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could sue.  (And companies implicated could sue the 
Underwriters if the latter were found to have done inadequate or 
improper testing when proper testing was promised.)  You would 
pay your money and take your choice.  As things now stand, you 
only pay your money, or do without, or try to get it from a foreign 
source.  The consumer deserves better than that. 
K. Managing Risk 
Two questions arise.  First, how much risk should be taken 
to be ìnormal?î  And second, how thorough and how precise does 
Seller have to be about what he puts on his labels by way of 
warning the customer of  risks? 
Regarding the first: nothing that anyone does is risk-free.  To 
live is to be subject to risk. Some of our activities elevate the level 
of risk we face in some respects: driving a car incurs a risk of 
having some kind of accident, skiing can be lethal, and so on.  
Common sense is enough to identify some of these, but assorted 
products entail risks that common sense would not know about.  
The unobvious surely needs mentioning.  But at what point does 
the obvious need noting? Parents may need to be warned about 
toys that might be risky for children.  But thereís not much point 
in manufacturers trying to warn the children themselves, and 
what parent is unaware of the dangers of childhood activities?  
How risky do things need to be before the user even needs to be 
warned?  It would be nice to be able to say something more 
interesting than ìsignificantly riskyîóbut still, that is the right 
answer.  The risk must be more than is obvious to common sense 
and significantly greater than the normal risks of everyday 
activity.  (The two sets are not quite coextensive.)  Further, to be 
significant, it must be at least discernible.  If the probability of 
breaking your leg or getting killed from using product X is about 
the same as what it would be if you stayed home and watched 
TV, it does not need to be mentioned.  If it is a thousand times 
higher, it probably does.  But if itís only three times as high?  Or 
seventeen?  Seventeen times .00001 is still very small.  But a 
thousand times that is .01, which is not. 
When warning is needed, because the risks involved are 
larger than the background ones just noted, how large does the 
print have to be?  How precise does the information need to be? 
These are not easy issues, but neither are they imponderable.  
The print has to be at least normally legible and the information 
can be quite approximate in normal casesóbut, if youíre selling it 
to scientists, it had better be much more precise.  Buying and 
selling take place in a particular market environment, and the 
levels of these variablesóprint-size, size of background risk, and, 
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hence, need to warnórequire adjustment to suit.  In the U.S. 
today, a new factor in our legal environment is the apparent 
willingness of courts to protect the consumer against himself in 
tort casesó$2.9 million for a cup of too-hot coffee spilled on an 
irate lady, for example.18  The courts now proceed on a principle 
having virtually nothing to do with the original purpose of torts, 
namely to compensate victims of injuries that were fairly clearly 
the fault of some other party.  But in so doing, they ìprotectî 
people at the expense of all the rest who have to pay the higher 
prices necessary to sustain the damage suits imposed by some 
few careless or malicious persons with the aid of the courts. 
Just what is the right solution to risk problems?  That is a 
much investigated question, and rightly so.  The suggestion here 
is fairly rudimentary: What Seller basically owes to Buyer is not 
to significantly increase his marginal involuntary net risk.  
Estimating that is not easy, and the fact that it is not (when it is 
not) is itself relevant and can be made part of the information 
package.  But it is the right idea. 
IV. THE BOTTOM LINE: CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY 
The maxim Caveat Emptor has much to be said for it.  
Provided it is understood how and when the merchant can be in 
the wrong, there must be a region in which the consumer makes 
his own decisions and takes responsibility for them.  If there is no 
misdescription of the goods, if there is no reason to expect net 
damage to health from her purchase, then the consumerís final 
protection does indeed lie in the fact that she can, as noted at the 
outset, simply say No.  The wise merchant will do his best to see 
to it that the consumer says Yesóafter all, thatís how he makes 
his living.  But his ìbestî after all has to be compatible with 
making a profit, and this means among other things keeping 
costs down.  Absolute certainty that the customer is going to be 
happy is not to be had and attempts to achieve it would make all 
goods prohibitively expensive.  That, of course, does no service to 
the consumer either.  A happy medium is needed, and that 
medium is best understood as an understanding, between seller 
and buyer, that is rational from both points of view.  In that 
respect, the proposals in this essay have merely been faithful to 
the idea of the market.  And that idea is a good oneóthe market 
answering to that idea is by far the best institution we can have 
for such things. 
 
 
 18 Big Jury Award for Coffee Burn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at D5. 
